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Paul: Conflicts of Interest

COMMENT
NOT BITING THE HAND THAT

FEEDS YOU:
PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS AND
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the public became aware of the accounting
misstatements of many major public companies. 1 Instances
such as the Enron and WorldCom debacles have eroded investor confidence. 2 As a result, the financial markets have suffered. 3 Between its peak on March 24,2000, and December 31,
2002, there was a $7.4 trillion loss in the market. 4 Since public
accounting firms are responsible for reasonably assuring the
accuracy of financial statements, a recurring question is,
"where were the auditors?"
In explaining why some public accounting firms have not
fulfilled their duty of assuring financial statement accuracy,
critics have identified conflicts of interest among auditors as a
central reason. 5 There are two major types of conflicts of inter1 Two well-known examples are Enron and WorldCom. See Patricia A. McCoy,
Realigning Auditors' Incentives, 35 CONN. L. REV. 989, 1005 (2003) (noting that by
June, 2002, WorldCom revealed that it had overstated its cash flow by $3.9 billion),
and HAROLD BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLF, EMERGING TRENDS IN SECURITIES LAw
48 (2002-2003) (stating that according to estimates at the time of Enron's bankruptcy
filing, it actually had debt of$13.5 to $27 billion).
2 McCoy, e.g., supra note 1, at 989-90.
3 McCoY, supra note 1, at 989-90.
4 Id. (measuring the loss based on the Wilshire 5000 Total Market Index).
5 See, e.g., S. REp. NO. 107-205, at 14-23 (2002).
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est that public accounting firms face. 6 They are external and
inherent conflicts of interest. 7 "External conflict of interest"
refers to the practice of an accounting firm providing non-audit
services to a client company concurrently with its audit services. 8 "Inherent conflict of interest" refers to the situation in
which a public accounting firm is hired, paid, and retained by
the public company it is auditing. 9 Both categories create conflicts of interest because the financial dependence present creates incentives to compromise independent judgment in favor
of the client company.10 These two categories are discussed in
more detail later.
Many professionals face conflicts of interest.tt The mere
existence of conflicts of interest does not itself indicate that
these professionals will compromise their duties. 12 Most auditors live up to their financial statement assurance obligation in
spite of the conflicts of interest they face. 13 Some auditors,
however, have knowingly failed to fulfill their obligations. 14
Given the impact financial misstatements have on the markets
in the form of lost investor confidence, some action is required. 15
In an effort to restore investor confidence in the wake of
several accounting scandals, including Enron and its auditor,
Arthur Andersen, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(hereinafter "The Act") in 2002.16 The Act addresses a wide arSee id. at 14.
See id.
S See w.
9 See w.
10 See id.
11 Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwacking the Ethical High Road: Conflicts of Interest in
the Practice of Law and Real Life, 28 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 87,174 (2003).
12Id.
13 McCoY, supra note 1, at 989.
14 Id. at 989-90.
15 See supra note 2-4 and accompanying text.
16 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, PuB. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S. C., 28 U.S.C., 29 U.S. C.).
Enron was considered the seventh largest corporation in the United States based on its
reported revenues, and up until it filed for bankruptcy in December 2001, it had retained Arthur Andersen to be its auditor. United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 2002
WL 464828 (S.D. Tex. Indictment Cr. No. CRH-02, Mar. 7, 2002). The Grand Jury
indictment of Arthur Andersen states that on or about October 16, 2001, Enron issued
a press release announcing a $618 million net loss for the third quarter of 2001, and
the SEC opened an inquiry into Enron the next day. Id. at 1. Arthur Andersen was
aware by this time of additional significant facts unknown to the public. Id. at 2. An
approximately $1.2 billion reduction in shareholder equity disclosed on October 16,
6
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ray of issues, but a significant portion of the Act focuses on ensuring the independence of public accounting firms.17 This is
an attempt to remove the conflicts of interest facing public accounting firms.
The Act, however, deals only with the external conflicts of
interest problem. IS The Act essentially prohibits an accounting
firm from performing most non-audit services, such as consulting services, for a client it is also auditing. 19 In its rush to deal
with the growing accounting scandals, it is perhaps understandable that Congress addressed the external conflicts of interest first, reserving for future deliberation whether and how
to deal with the inherent conflicts of interest. 2o The legislative
history behind the Act makes it clear that Congress may take
steps in the future to investigate and address the inherent conflicts of interest problem if the current legislation does not sufficiently achieve the desired results. 21

2001, was necessitated by Arthur Andersen and Enron having previously improperly
categorized hundreds of millions of dollars as an increase, rather than a decrease, to
Enron shareholder equity. [d. The press release characterized numerous charges
against income for the third quarter as "non-recurring" even though Arthur Andersen
believed the company did not have a basis for the conclusion. [d. Indeed, Arthur Andersen advised against using that term and documented its objections internally in the
event of litigation, but did not report its objections or otherwise take steps to cure the
public statement. [d. Arthur Andersen had also been put on direct notice, by a current
Enron and former Arthur Andersen employee, that possible fraud and other improprieties were taking place at Enron. [d.
By Friday, October 19, 2001, Enron alerted Arthur Andersen that the SEC had
begun an inquiry. [d. at 3. The next morning, an emergency conference call among
high-level Arthur Andersen management was convened, and it was decided that documentation that could assist Enron in responding to the SEC was to be assembled by
the Arthur Andersen auditors. [d. On October 23, 2001, Arthur Andersen's Enron
engagement team began a wholesale destruction of documents. [d. Arthur Andersen
personnel were called to a meeting and instructed to immediately destroy documentation relating to Enron and to work overtime if necessary to accomplish the destruction.
[d.
Over the next few weeks, the shredder at the Arthur Andersen office at the
Enron building was used virtually constantly, and trunks of documents were also sent
to Arthur Andersen's main office to be shredded. [d. A systematic effort was also
undertaken and carried out to purge the computer hard-drives and E-mail of Enronrelated files. [d. Enron-related documents were also ordered destroyed by personnel
working on Enron audit matters in Portland, Oregon; Chicago, Illinois; and London,
England. [d.
17 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, see generally supra note 16.
18 See id.
19 See 15 U.S.C. § 78(j-l) (2002).
20 S. REP. No. 107-205, at 14.
21 See id. at 21. See also 15 U.S.C. § 7232 (2002).
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If or when Congress decides to address the inherent conflicts of interest issue, what steps Congress may take is not
entirely clear.22 One proposed solution is mandatory rotation
every few years of the accounting firm performing the audit. 23
The Act directs the Comptroller General to study this proposal
to determine its potential effects.24 A mandatory accounting
firm rotation requirement would limit the closeness created by
a long-term relationship between the accounting firm and the
public corporation, and it would limit the incentive to compromise disinterested independent judgment in an effort to retain
a "perpetual" long-term client. 25
In addition to mandatory accounting-firm rotation, few
other solutions have been offered. 26 This Comment will discuss
- as an alternative solution - creating a competitive bidding
system overseen by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(hereinafter "SEC"). Such a system would require a corporation to pay for auditing services. 27 The SEC, not the audited
corporation, however, would control the hiring and retention
function. 28 This would limit the incentive for an accounting
firm to compromise its disinterested independent judgment to
be hired and retained by a client.
Section I of this Comment will discuss the role and responsibilities of public accounting firms and provide a brief background of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 29 Section II will explore the
mandatory audit firm rotation and other proposals seeking to
remedy the inherent conflicts of interest problem. 30 Lastly,
Section III proposes a competitive bidding system overseen by
the SEC as a potential remedy for this problem. 31

22 s. REP. No. 107-205, at 14, 2l.
231d. at 21. See also THE CONFERENCE BOARD, COMMISSION ON PuBLIC TRUST
AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 39 (2003) [hereinafter
COMMISSION),
available
at
http://www.
conferenceboard.orglknowledge/governCommission.cfm.
24 15 U.S.C. § 7232.
25 COMMISSION, supra note 23, at 39.
26 See infra at notes 159-68 and accompanying text.
27 See infra at notes 161-71 and accompanying text.
281d.
29 See infra at notes 32-133 and accompanying text.
30 See infra at notes 134-68 and accompanying text.
31 See infra at notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
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BACKGROUND

A.

WHAT IS THE ROLE OF A PuBLIC ACCOUNTANT?

329

Federal securities laws mandate a public company to prepare comprehensive financial statements certified by an independent certified public accountant. 32 In explaining why Congress requires this certification, the Senate discussions state
that:
Prior to SEC legislation ... it was by no means unusual to encounter semi fraudulent distortions of corporate accounts ... almost always for the purpose of making the results
look better than they were, and it was generally associated
with some scheme of stock-market manipulation in which the
management was participating. 33

Michael Sutton, former chief accountant of the SEC, has
explained the need for an independent audit:
Fundamental to the decision by the Congress in 1933 to require an independent audit was a recognition that the integrity of financial information provided to investors, and the
public perception of the integrity, are critical to the effectiveness and credibility of our capital markets. Thus, it is the independent auditor's objective "second look" at the issuer's financial statements that gives investors confidence that those
statements are reliable and provide a credible framework for
investor decisions to buy or sell securities of public issuers.
Both the fact and appearance of independence are necessary
to maintain the confidence of the investing public. 34

An auditor's opinion serves to furnish investors with a
critical assurance that rigorous examination is made of the financial statements by an impartial and skilled professiona1. 35
Public accounting firms must reasonably assure investors that
a public corporation's financial statements meet the Generally
32 s. REp. No. 107-205, at 5-6 (stating that each of the federal securities laws the 1933, 1934, 1935, and 1949 Acts - requires comprehensive financial statements
that must be prepared, in the words of the Securities Act of 1933, by "an independent
public or certified accountant").
33 [d.
34 SHAPmo, supra note 11, at 177.
35 [d.
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Accepted Accounting Principles (hereinafter "GAAP").36 GAAP
are a set of both broad and specific guidelines for companies to
follow when measuring and reporting the information in their
financial statements and related notes. 37 While it is the responsibility of the corporation's management to prepare the
financial statements, it is the auditor's responsibility to investigate and evaluate these statements to determine if the fmancial statements accurately depict the true financial position of
the corporation. 3s Because it is impractical to audit all of the
financial records of a corporation, public accounting firms use
methods, such as statistical sampling, according to the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (hereinafter "GAAS").39
GAAS are a set of guidelines that auditors are to follow when
performing an audit. 40 Audit methods performed in accordance
with the GAAS do not ensure the absolute accuracy of financial
statementsY Their use, however, creates a reasonable likelihood that material misstatements and fraud will be discovered. 42

B.

THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF PuBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS IS
OWED TO THE PuBLIC TRUST

One of the fundamental principles of fiduciary obligation is
the duty of loyalty.43 This duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary
to not be personally interested (referred to as being "disinterested").44 The fiduciary is required to put the interests of those
for whom the fiduciary acts or represents before the interests of
the fiduciary or others.45 Although fiduciary obligations are
present in numerous professions, public accounting firms are
unique because their obligation to the public always trumps

36 ALVIN A. ARENS & JAMES K LOEBBECKE, AUDITING AN INTEGRATED APPROACH
11 (8th ed. 2000).
37 J. DAVID SPICER ET AL., INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 9 (2d ed. 2001).
38 See ARENS & LOEBBECKE, supra note 36, at 142-43.
39 [d. at 143-44.
40 [d. at 37.
41 [d. at 142-43.
42 [d. at 142.
43 SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 92.
44 [d. at 92-93.
45

[d.
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their obligations to their audit clients.46 The United States Supreme Court emphasizes in United States v. Arthur Young &
Co., that the relationship between certified public accountants
and their clients must be characterized by disinterestedness
and absolute independence. 47 The Court states, "by certifying
the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the client."48 The Court characterizes the function of the accounting
firm as that of a "public watchdog" that requires complete fidelity to the public trust. 49
This public trust responsibility may sometimes be highly
burdensome, but it is certainly not without rewards. 50 The
Act's legislative history emphasizes that federal law requires a
publicly-traded company to hire an independent accounting
firm to perform an annual audit, essentially creating a shared
public monopoly that does not exist for other kinds of professional services. 51 This exclusive shared monopoly is a significant private benefit to public accountants, but is conditional on
the accountants' assuming a public duty and obligation. 52

C.

THE TRADITIONAL OVERSIGHT OF PuBLIC ACCOUNTING
FIRMS

Traditionally, the accounting profession has been overseen
by a hodgepodge of state and federal agencies, as well as numerous self-regulatory organizations. 53 The SEC is the top
regulatory organization in the United States. 54 The SEC issues
numerous accounting rules and interpretations that supplement those issued by private self-regulatory organizations. 55
46 Many fiduciaries have obligations to the public that trump those to their clients. SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 174. Doctors report certain communicable diseases,
psychotherapists and lawyers report clients likely to harm others, and therapists may
institutionalize clients against their will. ld. But auditors are unique in that their
public duties always trump their obligation to clients. ld.
47 See generally United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
48 ld. at 817.
49 ld. at 818.
so See S. REp. No. 107-205, at 14.

511d.
521d.
53
54
5Jj

SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 186-87.
ld.
ld.
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The SEC also brings civil, administrative, and criminal enforcement actions against accounting firms and accountants for
violations of these rules. 56 Historically, the SEC has acted as
an overseer, deferring to various private self-regulatory organizations such as the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (hereinafter "AICPA").57 The AICPA would set accounting standards, issue policy and practice guidelines, oversee accounting firms, undertake mandatory peer review, develop and enforce codes of professional conduct, and impose
disciplinary sanctions. 58
D.

THE INHERENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PuBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS AND
PuBLIC COMPANIES

As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court has
clearly articulated that the fiduciary obligations of public accounting firms reside exclusively with the public trust. 59 In
writing securities legislation, however, Congress created an
inherent conflict of interest between public accounting firms
and the public companies they audit.60 Public accounting firms
represent the interests of the investing publicY They must be
completely independent of the companies they audit, in fact
and appearance. 62 The securities laws, however, require that
an accounting firm be hired, retained, and paid by the company
being audited. 63 The inherent conflict of interest is that the
subject of the audit is the same entity upon which the accounting firm is financially dependent. 64 To use the old cliche, the
accounting firm faces the dilemma of whether to bite the hand
that feeds it. 65
56 Id.
57Id.
58 Id.
The AICPA, the largest professional organization of certified public accountants, has been the primary self-regulatory organization. Id. However, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the stock exchanges, and the audit committees of the boards of directors of public corporations have also played a role. Id.
59 Arthur Young & Co., see supra note 47, at 817-18.
60 SHAPIRO, see supra note 11, at 177.
61 Arthur Young & Co., see supra note 47, at 817-18.
62 SHAPIRO, see supra note 11, at 177.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 179.
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The Process of Hiring, Retaining, and Paying for an Audit
Engagement

During this relationship, the public company must first decide which accounting firm to hire to perform its audit. 66 In
winning an audit engagement, accounting firms compete based
on their reputation, fees, and expertise. 67 For the large public
corporations, reputation boils down primarily to "Big Four"
status. 68 In recent years, fees have become increasingly competitive. 69 Some accounting firms often offer their services at a
loss in the initial years of the relationship in an attempt to obtain a long term account.70 The problem is not that such market tactics are unethical; rather, the incentive to retain the client until the relationship has become profitable creates a conflict of interest. 71 For instance, if an auditor issues an unfavorable opinion during the early years of the relationship, it risks
losing the client even before the relationship has become profitable. 72
Public accounting firms often specialize in certain industries. 73 This expertise can lower the cost and increase the quality of the audit, especially in complex or highly specialized industries. 74 An unfortunate side effect is that public accounting
firms sometimes use this specialized expertise to devise "innovative" accounting treatments for the client. 75

66

MCCOY, supra note 1, at 994.

[d.
66 [d. The "Big Four," are the four largest certified public accounting firms in the
United States. ARENS & LoEBBECKE, supra note 36, at 25. Consolidation of firms has
led to a decline in the number of large firms. [d. For example, the "Big Six" became
the "Big Five" in 1998 with the merger of Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand.
[d. The "Big Five" then became the "Big Four" after the demise of Arthur Andersen.
67

SHAPIRO, supra note 11 at 175 n.117. The current firms are PricewaterhouseCoopers,
Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, and KPMG.
69 SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 180-81.
70 [d.
Fees have become increasingly competitive since the late 1970s when
Congress began pushing for more competition in the public auditing arena. [d. At one
time it was typical to bill junior auditors at a ratio of four times the cost of that employee. [d. Now it is common for this ratio to be less than two, and it is not uncommon
for the ratio to fall below one when another firm is trying to "steal" the account. [d.
71 See id. at 181.
72 MCCoy, see supra note 1, at 995.
73 [d. at 994.
74 See id.
75

[d.
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After the accounting firm is hired and has conducted the
audit, it must decide whether to issue an unqualified opinion. 76
If the accounting firm decides not to issue an unqualified opinion, the client - aware of the negative implications to follow must decide whether to replace the accounting firm.77 This
process is called "opinion shopping."78 The term "opinion shopping" refers to the practice of replacing the current accounting
firm to prevent the issuance of a negative opinion. 79 The SEC
has tried to discourage this practice by requiring corporations
to disclose publicly when they have changed accounting firms
performing the audit. 80 This requirement is at best an ambiguous red flag. 81 Many legitimate factors besides "trying to escape
from a truly independent auditor whose loyalty cannot be
bought or extorted" can justify the decision. 82 Furthermore,
disclosing a change of auditor may be counter-productive. 83 It
only discloses the situations in which the auditor's disinterest-

76 See id. at 995. The opinions that may be issued are: Standard Unqualified;
Unqualified with Explanatory Paragraph or Modified Wording; Qualified; or Adverse
or Disclaimer. ARENS & LOEBBECKE, supra note 36, at 47.
A Standard Unqualified opinion is issued when the following conditions are
met: All statements - balance sheet, income statement, statement of retained earnings, and statement of cash flows - are included in the financial statements; the general auditing standards have been followed in all respects on the engagement; sufficient evidence has been accumulated, and the auditor has conducted the engagement
in a manner that enables him or her to conclude that the field work standards have .
been met; the financial statements are presented in accordance with GAAP; and there
are no circumstances requiring the addition of an explanatory paragraph or modification in the wording of the opinion. Id.
An Unqualified with Explanatory Paragraph or Modified Wording opinion is
issued when a complete audit took place with satisfactory results and financial statements are fairly presented, but the auditor believes that it is important or is required
to provide additional information. Id.
A Qualified opinion is issued when the auditor concludes that the overall financial statements are fairly presented, but the scope of the audit has been materially
restricted or GAAP were not followed in preparing the financial statements. Id.
An Adverse or Disclaimer opinion is issued when the auditor concludes that
the financial statements are not fairly presented (adverse), he or she is unable to form
an opinion as to whether the financial statements are fairly presented (disclaimer), or
he or she is not independent (disclaimer). Id.
77 McCoY, supra note 1, at 995.
78 SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 179.
79Id.
8() Id.

81Id.
82Id.
83

See Id.
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edness might have triumphed, leaving undisclosed those situations where the auditor caved to client pressures.84

2.

Conflicts of Interest of Individual Partners

In addition to the inherent institutional conflicts of interest discussed above, there are often personal conflicts of interest for public accounting firm partners as well. 85 This arises
when the partner must choose whether to acquiesce to questionable or fraudulent accounting practices. 86 In some quarters
of the profession, there is a "lose-your-client-lose-your-job" philosophy.87 In these firms, partners who lose clients are often
fired for being "nonproductive."BS The partner must decide
whether to fulfill his or her fiduciary obligation to the public
trust, or risk his or her employment with the accounting firm.89
E.

EXTERNAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN PuBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS AND PuBLIC
COMPANIES

In an attempt to become more profitable, public accounting
firms have, in recent years, began offering many non-audit services to their clients. 9o In 2000, audit services were contributing, on average, less than a third to firm revenues. 91 Some
firms were even using audits as a loss leader to sell their other
services. 92 The Arthur AndersenlEnron relationship epitomizes
the financial dependence of an accounting firm on its client. 93
In the year before Enron's demise, Arthur Andersen had

Id.
Id. at 179, n.123.
86 Id.
87Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 14.
91 SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 18I.
92 Id. A loss leader is the practice of using an unprofitable product to aid in the
selling of profitable ones to the same customer. See id. Accounting firms would "sell"
the audit services at a price less than the cost. See Id. But in conjunction with, or
afterward, the accounting firm would sell the highly profitable non-audit services to
these same clients. Id.
93 See Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking
the Federal Securities Laws, 28 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 725, 799 (2003).
84

85
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earned $52 million in fees from their relationship.94 Many
question providing non-audit services to the same public corporation that the public accounting firm is also auditing, since
this creates additional external conflicts of interest. 95 The more
financially dependent an accounting firm becomes on its client,
the greater the incentive to compromise its disinterested independent judgment.96
F.

THE ACCOUNTING MISSTATEMENT REVELATIONS THAT
BROUGHT THE ISSUE OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST TO THE
FOREFRONT

After the financial market began to fall from its late 1990
record highs, the public discovered that the financial statements of some public companies were not depicting their true
financial position. 97 Instead of making the GAAP-required full
and adequate disclosures, some companies had carefully constructed financial statement footnotes in an apparent attempt
to hide what probably should have been line items, or they
simply left out information that should have been in the statement's footnotes. 98 Many of the techniques used by these public
companies were not only aggressive, but unacceptable according to GAAP standards. 99
On October 26, 2001, Enron announced that it would be
taking a third quarter charge of $1.01 billion. 100 This announcement caught the attention of not only the financial
community, but Congress and the general public as well.101
Within two months of the announcement, Enron filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.102 Enron's $13.15 billion bankruptcy filing
was the largest of its kind in United States history. lOa Enron
had also disclosed that it would be restating prior financial
94

[d.

See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 14.
See id.
97 Thomas Wardell, The Current State of Play Under the Sarbanes·Oxley Act of
2002,28 N.C.J. INT'LL. & COM. REG. 935, 937 (2003).
98 [d.
99 [d.
100 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 1, at 47-48.
95

96

[d.
[d. at 48.
103 [d. Many bankers estimated the actual amount to be $27 billion because Enron failed to include its off-balance sheet debt. [d.
101

102
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statements that failed to follow the GAAP standards. 104 This
restatement would result in reductions of reported net income
of approximately $96 million in 1997, $113 million in 1998,
$250 million in 1999, and $132 million in 2000; increases of $17
and $5 million for the first two quarters of 2001; and a reduction of $17 million for the third quarter of 2001.105
Although news of other alarming financial reporting irregularities preceded Enron's, none captured the same attention. 106 Investor confidence further deteriorated after a series of
revelations about other corporate accounting irregularities, and
it became apparent that Enron was only the tip of the iceberg. 107 The demise of the Arthur Andersen public accounting
firm soon followed the Enron revelations. loa On March 7, 2002,
the SEC obtained a grand jury indictment against Arthur Andersen for obstruction of justice in connection with its investigation of Enron. 109
Mistakes and fraud will sometimes go undetected by
proper audit procedures yo It is hard to believe, however, that
these procedural errors account for many of the recently discovered financial misstatements. The Arthur Andersen incident supports the notion that some accounting firms were well
aware of these mistakes and fraudulent accounting practices. 111

G.

CONGRESS REACTS By PASSING THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

In response to the numerous accounting scandal revelations, Congress rushed to investigate and enact legislation to
prevent accounting misstatements from occurring in the future. 112 A recurring issue raised was concern over accounting
firm independence and conflicts of interest. 113 Congress real[d.
[d.
106 [d. at 50.
107 [d.
108 [d.
109 Arthur Andersen LLP, supra note 16. Less than nine months after its first
disclosure that documents related to its audit of Enron had been improperly shredded,
Arthur Andersen was out of the public accounting business, having lost all of its more
than 1,200 public-company audit clients and most of its global network of 85,000 employees. SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 90.
110 ARENS & LOEBBECKE, see supra note 36, at 143-44
111 Arthur Anderson LLP, see generally supra note 16.
112 BLOOMENTHAL, see supra note 1, at 64.
113 See id. at 63-67.
104

105
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ized that there is an inherent conflict by the mere fact that the
auditor is paid by the same company it is independently auditing. u4 Congress, however, felt the more immediate concern was
that in the last 15 years, the rapid growth in non-audit services
offered by the major accounting firms has further eroded the
independence that the auditor must bring to the audit function. u5
Both houses of Congress proposed legislation attempting to
prevent material financial misstatements in the future. u6 The
House version was the Oxley Bill, and the Senate version was
the Sarbanes Bill.1l7 On June 25, 2002, after WorldCom confessed its $3.8 billion accounting fraud, the fate for financial
fraud reform legislation was sealed. us The Senate deleted the
House version and used the language of the Sarbanes Bill.u9
The Act was signed into law on July 30, 2002.120
1.

A Significant Part of tire Act's focus is on Auditor Independence

The Act covers a broad spectrum of investor confidence issues. l2l The issue of auditor independence, however, is a centerpiece of the legislation. 122 This is because public accounting
S. REP. No. 107-205, at 14.
[d.
116 BLOOMENTHAL, see supra note 1, at 64-66.
117 [d. By March 8, 2002, there had been over 30 Enron inspired bills introduced
in Congress. [d. at 64. The serious legislative process that eventually led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not begin until Representative Oxley introduced his bill to the
House of Representatives on February 14, 2002. [d. The bill passed the House on
April 24, 2002 by a vote of 334-90. [d. at 64-65.
The Senate bill began as a draft bill in the Senate Banking Committee, chaired
by Senator Sarbanes. [d. at 65. The Committee's action followed ten hearings on the
accounting and investor protection issues raised by the revelations involving Enron
and other public companies. [d. On June 18, 2002, the Senate Committee considered
the "Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002," which
was reported favorably by a vote of 17-4. [d. at 65-66. The Sarbanes Bill was passed
by the Senate on July 15, 2002, by a vote of 97-0. [d. at 66.
The Act was passed by the House of Representatives on July 25, 2002 by a vote
of 423-3, and on the same day passed the Senate by a vote of 99-0. [d. at 67. The
President signed it into law on July 30, 2002. [d.
118 [d. at 66.
119 [d. (The joint Conference Committee agreed to what was primarily the Senate
version designated as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
120 [d. at 67.
121 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, see supra note 16.
122 [d.
114

115
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firms are an essential part of investor confidence. 123 Financial
statement integrity rests on the independence of the audit.124
As a result, the accounting profession is a main target of the
Act's regulations. 125

2.

The Act Focuses on Limiting External Conflicts of Interest
and Centralizing Regulation Rulemaking and Enforcement

The Act takes several different approaches in an effort to
increase the independence of public accounting firms performing an audit. First, the Act explicitly codifies eight non-audit
services that a registered public accounting firm may no longer
perform contemporaneously with its audit of a public company.126 Second, the Act creates a new agency to oversee the
public accounting firms and enforce the Act. 127 This agency is
titled the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (hereinafter "PCAOB").128 Essentially, the PCAOB's primary function is to assume the role previously assumed by the AICPA,
and bring together various issues and responsibilities that
have in the past been subject to what has been characterized as
"a bewildering array of monitoring groups" under the auspices
of the accounting profession. 129 Third, the Act provides that if a
123 William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes·Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus
Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1023, 1024 (2003).
124 S. REp. No. 107-205, at 14.
125 BRATTON, supra note 123, at 1024.
126 These eight non-audit services are: bookkeeping or other services related to the
accounting records or financial statements of the audit client; financial information
systems design; appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-inkind reports; actuarial services; internal audit outsourcing services; management functions or human resources; broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking
services; and legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-

1.

A firm under the Act may perform non-audit services for an audit client other
than those listed above, including tax services, only if approved in advance by the audit
committee of the issuer. [d.
127 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2002).
126 The PCAOB is responsible to "oversee the audit of public companies that are
subject to the securities laws, and related matters, in order to protect the interests of
investors and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate,
and independent audit reports for companies the securities of which are sold to, and
held by and for, public investors." [d.
129 S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 4-5. The main responsibilities of the PCAOB are to:
register public accounting firms; establish or adopt auditing, quality control, ethics,
independence, and other standards relating to the preparation of audit reports; conduct
inspections of registered public accounting firms; and conduct investigations and disci-
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company executive was employed by the accounting firm the
previous year, and participated in any capacity in that company's audit, the accounting firm cannot provide its audit services. 13o
In addition to the above-mentioned steps that the Act
takes, public accounting firms are also required to regularly
interface with the company's audit committee. 131 The auditors
now report to the audit committee instead of to management. 132
The accounting firm must inform the audit committee of those
aspects of the audit that represent critical accounting policies,
aggressive accounting positions, alternative treatments, and
the substance of the audit findings. 133

II.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED TO REMEDY THE
INHERENT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST PROBLEM

A.

MANDATORY AUDIT FIRM ROTATION

As previously mentioned, Congress may take steps necessary to deal with the inherent conflicts of interest problem with
the relationship between public accounting firms and public
corporations. 134 During the Senate hearings, various witnesses
recommended mandatory audit firm rotation. 135 In response,
Congress authorized the Comptroller General of the General

plinary proceedings, and impose appropriate sanctions where justified, upon registered
public accounting firms and associated persons of such firms. [d.
130 15 U.S.C. § 78(j·l).
131 [d.
132 WARDELL, see supra note 97 at 939. Sarbanes-Oxley requires that the board of
directors of public companies have an audit committee, and that the audit committee
be independent. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j-l). This means that a member of an audit committee
of an issuer may not, other than in his or her capacity as a member of the audit committee, the board of directors, or any other board committee, do the following: accept
any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer; or be an affiliated
person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof. [d.
133 15 U.S.C. § 78(j-1).
134 S. REP. No. 107-205, at 2l.
135 [d. at 20. Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt proposed "that consideration
be given to requiring companies to change their audit firm ... every 5-7 years to ensure
that fresh and skeptical eyes are always looking at the numbers." [d. John Whitehead, former Co-Chairman, Goldman Sachs & Co., recommended requiring "term
limits of 8-10 years." [d. And Lynn Turner, former SEC Chief Accountant, recommended requiring "mandatory rotation (5-7 years)." [d.
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Accounting Office to study and review potential effects of mandatory audit rotation. 13G

1.

The Arguments That Have Been Made in Favor of and
Against Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation

The Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and
Private Enterprise (hereinafter "Commission") views that an
audit firm rotation would provide a useful tool in building
shareholder confidence in the integrity of the audit and of the
company's financial statements. 137 One benefit of audit firm
rotation is that an incoming accounting firm would provide a
fresh look at the company's finances, accounting practices, and
the former firm's audit. 13s The Commission further states that
mandatory audit firm rotation would reduce the financial incentives for audit firms to compromise their judgment on the
borderline issues. 139 The audit engagement would no longer be
perceived as permanent. 140 The Commission states that in disagreeing with management, auditors would no longer risk losing a "perpetual" stream of revenues. 141
The argument against mandatory audit firm rotation is
that such a requirement would not improve the quality of audits and, therefore, would not be in the public's best interest.142
13G 15 U.S.C. § 7232. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1405 (7th ed. 1999) (defining
General Accounting Office as "the federal agency that provides legal and accounting
assistance to Congress, audits and investigates federal programs, and settles certain
contract claims against the United States").
137 COMMISSION, supra note 23, at 39 (The Conference Board convened a 12member commission in June 2002 to address the causes of declining public and investor trust in companies, their leaders and America's capital markets. The members
include prominent leaders from business, finance, public service, and academia. The
Commission is co-chaired by Peter G. Paterson, Chairman of The Blackstone Group
and Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; and John W. Snow, Chairman and CEO ofCSX Corporation and former Chairman of the Business Roundtable).
138 ld.
139 ld.
140 ld.
l41ld.
142 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PuBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT OF
POSITION REGARDING MANDATORY ROTATION OF AUDIT FIRMS OF PuBLICLY HELD
COMPANIES,
2-3
(1992)
[hereinafter,
AICPA],
available
at
http://www.aicpa.org/membersldiv/secps/lit/sopslI900.htm. See also generally UNITED
STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PuBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS: REQUIRED STUDY
ON THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF MANDATORY AUDIT FIRM ROTATION (Nov. 2003) (coming
to essentially the
same conclusions as
the AICPA),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.itemsld04216.pdf.
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For instance, such a requirement would dramatically increase
the costs for firms, clients, and the public, and it would increase the likelihood of poor audits by depriving auditors of
their most valuable tool: experience with a client and the resulting comprehensive knowledge of its business and operations. 143 Groups that have studied the mandatory audit firm
rotation conclude that the costs greatly outweigh the perceived
benefits.144 Such studies have indicated that audit failures occur as much as three times as often when the audit firm is performing its first or second audit of the company.145 Former SEC
Chairman Manuel Cohen stated:
In a study of cases of substandard performance by auditors,
several of the problem cases were first- or second-year audits.
While not conclusive, this indicates the higher peril associated with new audit clients. Once an auditor becomes well
acquainted with the operations of a client, audit risks are reduced. If a relationship between audit failures and new clients does exist, rotation would increase the problem and be
detrimental to users.146

Furthermore, opponents of mandatory audit firm rotation
argue that each time a rotation occurs, management will be
faced with a disruptive, time-consuming, and expensive process
by having to select a new accounting firm and familiarize it
with the operations, procedures, systems, and industry environment of the company.147

2.

A Comparative Analysis of Audit Quality Failures and Fiduciary Obligation Failures

An important element critics of mandatory audit firm rotation ignore is the cost associated with using an accounting firm
that is compromising its judgment because of its lack of independence. l48 These critics view the core benefits of mandatory
audit firm rotation as being only a fresh look at the company's
AICPA, supra note 142, at 2-3.
at 3.
145 [d.
146 [d.
147 [d. at 4.
148 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
143

144 [d.
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finances, accounting practices, and former firm's audit.149 They
compare this against the costs of first- or second-year audit
failures. 1so If the only problem were the deficiency of audits,
the costs of mandatory audit firm rotation would clearly outweigh the benefits. The core concern, however, is (or should be)
the cumulative cost of audit firms failing to fulfill their fiduciary duties. 151
As a result of public accounting firms' failure to fulfill their
fiduciary duties, there is an erosion of public trust in the capital market. 152 The indictment and conviction of Arthur Andersen is evidence that many financial misstatements were not
primarily the result of substandard or incomplete audits. 153
Instead, they were the result of accounting firms knowingly
compromising their independence and engaging in or acquiescing in questionable or outright fraudulent accounting practices
in order to hang onto lucrative business relationships. 1M The
cost of first- or second-year audit failures is certainly a significant issue. The high cost on the capital market resulting from
erosion of public trust, however, is arguably more important. 1S5

3.

The Shortfalls of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation in
Remedying Conflicts of Interest

Mandatory audit firm rotation would remedy some of the
conflict of interest problems that critics of the current system
seek to eliminate. 156 Most importantly, it would likely reduce
the incentive for accounting firms to compromise their independent judgment in the hope of continuing a profitable client
relationship for an extended or indefinite period of time. 157
Mandatory audit firm rotation would not, however, eliminate
an accounting firm's incentive to compromise its independent
judgment in order to bring in and retain client relationships,
even if the relationships last for only five to seven years. 15S
AICPA, supra note 142, at 3.
[d.
151 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
152 [d.
153 Arthur Andersen LLP, see generally supra note 16.
154 [d.
155 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
156 S. REp. No. 107-205, at 21.
157 COMMISSION, see supra note 23, at 39.
158 Cf id.
149

150
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FEDERALIZING THE PuBLIC ACCOUNTING PROFESSION

While mandatory audit firm rotation may fall short of
completely eliminating the inherent conflicts of interest that
arise in an audit, some alternatives are either extreme or unworkable. There has been a suggestion to federalize the public
accounting profession. 1s9 Few advocates, however, favor creating a new federal bureaucracy with public accountants becoming federal employees. 1GO
C.

A COMPETITIVE BIDDING SYSTEM

A competitive bidding system is one middle-ground solution proposed by the Commission. 161 The Commission recommends that the audit committees of public companies use a
bidding process for selecting an accounting firm to conduct
their audits. 162 According to the Commission recommendation,
every five to seven years, an audit committee should engage in
a review process for the audit engagement. 163 During this review process, proposals from current and other qualified accounting firms would be solicited and submitted. 164 Despite the
fact that the current accounting firm may be retained, the
Commission views the competitive bidding process as important. 16S Such a process would emphasize to external auditors
that they report to the audit committee, rather than to management. 166
One potential downfall of the competitive bidding system
proposal is that the hiring and retention process would still be
made by an arm of the company.167 Although now required by
the Act to be independent, the audit committee's loyalty still
essentially resides in its company. 1GB To truly remove the inherent conflicts of interest in the relationship between a public
159 See Jim Peters, Panel 1: The Collapse of the Corporate Model, 52 AM. U. L.
REv. 579, 591 (2003).
160 [d.
161 COMMISSION, see supra note 23, at 40.
162 [d.
163
164

165
166
167

168

[d.
[d.
[d.

[d.
Cf id.
[d.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss2/4

20

Paul: Conflicts of Interest

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

2004]

345

accounting firm and a public company, the hiring and retention
decisions must be removed from the audited company's control.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION: A MANDATORY COMPETITIVE
BIDDING SYSTEM, OVERSEEN BY THE SEC
A mandatory competitive bidding system overseen by the
SEC would eliminate the audited company's participation in
the selection and retention of its auditor. Furthermore, such a
system would keep auditing costs at reasonable levels. With
the bidding process monitored by the SEC, the public company
would provide detailed relevant information to the SEC concerning matters such as size, type of business, and detailed internal controls descriptions. Such information would be required for accounting firms to make an accurate bid proposal.
The SEC would then collect bids from accounting firms and
award the contract. This process would be open to all qualified
public accounting firms. The implication of stringent requirements would ensure that accounting firms competing for the
business are qualified and meet the minimum requirements for
quality auditing.
After ensuring compliance with all the qualification and
bidding requirements, the contract would be awarded to the
lowest bidder. Basing an award solely on price is not without
flaws. One problem is that it could lead to a decline in the
quality of the audit. Ancillary steps would be required to ensure that audit quality be maintained at satisfactory levels.
Many of these steps already exist in the regulatory system. 169
Penalties for audit-quality deficiencies are enforced through
judgments, settlements, and fines paid to plaintiffs and government authorities. 170 These sanctions can be buttressed either with the threat of losing the opportunity to compete in the
next bid for the client's business, or even more broadly, in bids
to perform work for other companies. This threat to future
revenues would greatly reduce the incentive to perform incomplete audits, under-staff audits, or staff audits with cheaper,
inexperienced auditors in a quest to lower costs. Any benefit
derived from lowering the quality of the audit would be offset

169

MCCoy, supra note 1, at 1002.

170

[d.
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by the risk of large financial costs to the accounting firm in the
form of lost future business. Cost savings would be encouraged
to come from strategic moves and technological and managerial
innovations on the part of the accounting firms, rather than
from cutting essential elements of the audit process that might
compromise the quality of the audit. Another attractive aspect
of a competitive bidding process is that the awarded contract
would be for a fixed-term with no right to terminate without
cause. This fixed-term requirement would be beneficial for two
reasons. First, a fixed-term contract is important for calculating a bid price. The accounting firm would be able to calculate
the cost savings that go along with repeat audits of the same
client, structuring its pricing system accordingly without risk
of being let go. This long-term relationship, without the risk of
premature termination, would lessen the accounting firm's
temptation to compromise its independent judgment during the
early years.
Second, a fixed-term contract would prevent the audited
company from engaging in opinion shopping. Since an audited
company would have no right to dismiss an accounting firm at
will, the company would be forced to comply with the GAAP
standards. A remedial procedure, however, would be required
for companies that genuinely disagree with an auditor's opinion, similar to an appeals process. Such a process would require the company to prove that the accounting firm was wrong
in its assessment of the company's financial statements. An
SEC review board could easily accomplish this procedure.
Unlike the current disclosure requirements when a company
changes audit firms, an SEC review board would be able to
evaluate the evidence presented and determine if the company
has a legitimate complaint. An SEC board would have the authority to resolve the disagreement or sanction the company for
bringing a frivolous complaint.
A.

SUCH COMPETITIVE BIDDING DOES POSE A RISK TO AUDIT

QUALITY

A potential disadvantage of a competitive bidding system
is the possibility of lower profits for public accounting firms. It
is questionable whether a substantial decline in profitability
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would occur, since the current market is already highly competitive. l7l In the event of lowered profit margins, a possible
result could be that the public accounting profession would be
faced with the problem of not being able to attract some highly
qualified auditors. This result may occur due to a reduction in
the anticipated income from becoming a partner. To truly understand the actual impact on the public accounting profession,
independent studies would have to be conducted to determine
how many qualified persons might leave or choose not to enter
the profession. While some qualified accountants would shift
to the private sector for larger salaries, it seems unlikely that
the public accounting industry would not be able to attract
qualified persons to fill the void.
B.

Is THERE ENOUGH COMPETITION FOR A COMPETITIVE
BIDDING SYSTEM?

Another potential problem with implementing a competitive bidding system is that in order for the bidding system to
work properly, there must be a sufficient amount of competitors. Currently, the majority of public corporations are audited
by the Big Four, and it is questionable whether so few competitors would create enough competition. Under a competitive
bidding system, smaller qualified accounting firms might be
able to enter the market, from which they have historically
been excluded. Smaller firms could make strategic moves into
the market through niche expertise or by concentrating on specific geographical areas.
IV. CONCLUSION

Because of the important role that public accounting firms
play in ensuring investor confidence in the financial market, it
is imperative that auditors meet their fiduciary duty to the
public trust.172 Conflicts of interest create incentives for accounting firms to compromise their independent judgment.
While many auditors live up to their public trust duties, those

171
172

See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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that have not, or do not, pose a significant risk to the financial
markets. 173
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act addresses the external conflicts of
interest that have become common in recent years. 174 The Act,
however, does not deal with the inherent conflicts of interest
present in the relationship between public accounting firms
and public companies. To further the independence of public
accounting firms, these inherent conflicts of interest may be
addressed by Congress in the future. 175 A competitive bidding
process overseen by the SEC would remove the inherent conflicts of interest that other proposals fail to eliminate.
GREGORY L. PAUL'

See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, see supra note 16.
175 S. REp. No. 107-205, at 2l.
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